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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
 No.  12-2268 
___________ 
 
ZURICH AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY; 
NORTHERN INSURANCE COMPANY OF NEW YORK 
 
v. 
 
R.M. SHOEMAKER CO.; COUNTY OF MONMOUTH 
 
v. 
 
PENNSYLVANIA MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION 
INSURANCE COMPANY 
 
                                              R.M. Shoemaker Company, 
                                                                                  Appellant 
 
_______________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
D.C. Civil Action No. 2-12-cv-00873 
(Honorable Harvey Bartle, III) 
______________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
March 4, 2013 
 
Before:  SCIRICA, JORDAN, and ROTH, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed: March 27, 2013) 
 
_________________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_________________ 
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SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
 Insurance companies brought declaratory judgment actions to determine whether 
they must defend and indemnify their insured in a lawsuit pending in New Jersey state 
court. The district court granted summary judgment to the insurance companies, finding 
the commercial general liability policies between the insurance companies and the 
insured did not afford coverage under the circumstances of the underlying action. We will 
affirm. 
I. 
The County of Monmouth brought suit against R.M. Shoemaker Company in New 
Jersey state court (the “Underlying Action”), alleging Shoemaker, a construction 
contracting firm, faultily constructed an addition to the Monmouth County Correctional 
Institution in Freehold, New Jersey. Among other things, Monmouth alleges Shoemaker 
negligently supervised its subcontractor, thereby permitting the subcontractor to engage 
in willful misconduct and resulting in damage to both structural elements and personal 
property of the County Correctional Institution.
1
 Monmouth alleges Shoemaker‟s 
negligence permitted water to intrude into the County Correctional Institution, reduced its 
structural integrity, and damaged interior property including “the electrical systems, the 
suspended acoustic tile ceilings and miscellaneous equipment.”  
Zurich American Insurance Company (“Zurich”) and Northern Insurance 
                                                 
1
 The contract between Monmouth and Shoemaker provided that Shoemaker was 
responsible for the “construction means, methods, techniques, sequences and procedures” 
associated with “all portions of the Work under the Contract,” and was obligated to 
“[c]oordinate, manage, inspect and supervise all phases” of that work. 
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Company of New York (“Northern”) sought a declaratory judgment in the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania that they were not required to 
defend or indemnify Shoemaker, their insured, in the Underlying Action. Shoemaker 
served a third-party complaint against another of its insurers, Pennsylvania 
Manufacturers Association Insurance Company (“PMA”), and sought declaratory 
judgments that Zurich, Northern, and/or PMA had the duty to defend and indemnify 
Shoemaker in the Underlying Suit.
2
 
The commercial general liability policies between Insurance Companies and 
Shoemaker use the same language, and only provide coverage for property damage 
caused by an “occurrence.” The term “occurrence” is defined in the policies as “an 
accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general 
harmful conditions.”  
Insurance Companies moved for summary judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. 
Finding Pennsylvania substantive law governed the dispute, the district court held 
Insurance Companies were not required to defend Shoemaker because Monmouth‟s 
allegations in the Underlying Action did not arise from an “occurrence” as the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has construed that term. Shoemaker appeals and seeks to 
certify this case to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. We will affirm the judgment of the 
district court.
3
  
                                                 
2
 Zurich and Northern (plaintiffs-appellees) as well as PMA (third-party defendant-
appellee) are hereafter referred to as “Insurance Companies” for ease of discussion.  
3
 The district court had jurisdiction of the original action under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) 
and supplemental jurisdiction of Shoemaker‟s third-party complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 
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II. 
This case involves the intersection of two Pennsylvania Supreme Court cases 
construing what may constitute an “occurrence.” In Kvaerner, the court held an insurance 
company was not required to defend its insured against claims of faulty workmanship 
because such claims were not sufficiently fortuitous to constitute an accident. 908 A.2d at 
899. Insurance Companies argue that since Monmouth‟s allegations amount to claims of 
faulty workmanship, they cannot be required to defend the suit. But in Donegal Mutual 
Insurance Company v. Baumhammers, the court held an insurance company may be 
required to defend its insured against claims arising from the intentional acts of a third 
party, at least where the insured‟s negligence enabled the third party‟s actions. 938 A.2d 
286, 293 (Pa. 2007). Shoemaker contends that since its negligent supervision facilitated 
its subcontractor‟s willful misconduct, Baumhammers dictates that Insurance Companies 
must defend Shoemaker in the Underlying Action.  
Shoemaker oversimplifies Baumhammers, contending it stands for the proposition 
that an “occurrence” has taken place whenever the insured‟s negligence leads to a third 
                                                                                                                                                             
1367. See In re Texas E. Transmission Corp. PCB Contamination Ins. Coverage Litig., 
15 F.3d 1230, 1238 (3d Cir. 1994) (“We hold that the additional non-diverse 
counterclaim defendants do not destroy diversity jurisdiction in the . . . action because 
there is complete diversity of citizenship between the originally named parties.”). We 
review the interpretation of an insurance policy de novo. Kvaerner Metals Div. of 
Kvaerner U.S., Inc. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 908 A.2d 888, 897 (Pa. 2006). The 
court first looks to the language of the insurance policies to determine in which instances 
they provide coverage, and then examines the underlying complaint “to determine 
whether the allegations set forth therein constitute the type of instances that will trigger 
coverage.” Id. at 896-97. If coverage is triggered, “the insurer has a duty to defend . . . . 
Although the duty to defend is separate from and broader than the duty to indemnify, 
both duties flow from a determination that the complaint triggers coverage.” Gen. 
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party‟s willful misconduct. Baumhammers‟ holding actually hinged upon the randomness 
of the third party‟s misconduct—a shooting rampage, perpetrated by Richard 
Baumhammers—from the perspective of the insured, his parents. Id. at 288. The families 
of the shooting victims brought suit against Richard‟s parents, alleging the parents were 
negligent in permitting Richard to have a gun and failing to procure mental health 
treatment for him. Id. at 288-89. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that Donegal 
Insurance—which insured the parents under a general liability policy similar to the 
present case—was required to defend the parents against the victims‟ suits. Id. at 293. 
The court explained: 
The extraordinary shooting spree embarked upon by Baumhammers 
resulting in injuries to Plaintiffs cannot be said to be the natural and 
expected result of Parents [sic] alleged acts of negligence. Rather, 
Plaintiffs‟ injuries were caused by an event so unexpected, undesigned and 
fortuitous as to qualify as accidental within the terms of the policy. Because 
the alleged negligence of Parents resulted in the tragic accidental injuries to 
the individual plaintiffs, Donegal is therefore required to defend Parents. 
 
Id. As Baumhammers indicates, the crucial inquiry dictating whether a general liability 
insurer must defend its insured under an occurrence-based policy is whether an event was 
sufficiently fortuitous from the perspective of the insured to qualify as an “occurrence.” 
See id. at 292 (“An injury . . . is not „accidental‟ if the injury was the natural and expected 
result of the insured‟s actions.”).  
Kvaerner and cases following it make clear that faulty workmanship under a 
contract is not sufficiently fortuitous to qualify as an “occurrence.” In Kvaerner, a steel 
company brought suit against Kvaerner for breach of contract and breach of warranty, 
                                                                                                                                                             
Accident Ins. Co. of Am. v. Allen, 692 A.2d 1089, 1095 (Pa. 1997) (citation omitted). 
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alleging a coke oven battery Kvaerner designed and built was damaged and failed to meet 
contract specifications. 908 A.2d at 891. In determining that Kvaerner‟s insurer did not 
have to defend the suit, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court explained that “[t]he key term in 
the ordinary definition of „accident‟ is „unexpected.‟ This implies a degree of fortuity that 
is not present in a claim for faulty workmanship.” Id. at 898. Therefore, the court held  
the definition of “accident” required to establish an “occurrence” under the 
policies cannot be satisfied by claims based upon faulty workmanship. 
Such claims simply do not present the degree of fortuity contemplated by  
the ordinary definition of “accident” or its common judicial construction in 
this context. To hold otherwise would be to convert a policy for insurance 
into a performance bond. We are unwilling to do so, especially since such 
protections are already readily available for the protection of contractors. 
 
Id. at 899 (footnotes omitted). The court further rationalized this rule, stating that such 
policies cover “tort liability for physical damages to others and not . . . contractual 
liability of the insured for economic loss because the product or completed work is not 
that for which the damaged person bargained.” Id. at 899 n.10 (quoting Insurance 
Protection for Products Liability and Completed Operations; What Every Lawyer Should 
Know, 50 Neb. L. Rev. 415, 441 (1971)). 
The Pennsylvania Superior Court expanded upon Kvaerner in Millers Capital 
Insurance Co. v. Gambone Brothers Development Co., 941 A.2d 706 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
2007). The analysis in Gambone is apposite because of its factual similarity to the present 
case. See also Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Buffetta, 230 F.3d 634, 637 (3d Cir. 2000) 
(stating a federal court should not disregard the opinion of a state‟s intermediate appellate 
court unless convinced by persuasive data that the state‟s supreme court would decide 
differently). Gambone specifically rejected the argument that faulty workmanship by a 
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subcontractor may constitute an “occurrence” or “accident” from the perspective of the 
contractor. 941 A.2d at 715. Gambone further noted that insurance coverage and defense 
was precluded for “natural and foreseeable acts, such as rainfall, which tend to exacerbate 
the damage, effect, or consequences caused ab initio by faulty workmanship,” since such 
acts, like faulty workmanship, were not sufficiently fortuitous. Id. at 713. Moreover, in 
Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. CPB International, Inc., we relied in part on 
Gambone to predict the Pennsylvania Supreme Court would not require a general liability 
insurer to defend an action arising out of a contract dispute—even if the plaintiff in the 
underlying action asserted consequential damages. 562 F.3d 591, 597 (3d Cir. 2009).   
Kvaerner and Gambone control the outcome of this dispute. Faulty 
workmanship—whether caused by the contractor‟s negligence alone or by the 
contractor‟s negligent supervision, which then permitted the willful misconduct of its 
subcontractors—does not amount to an “accident” or “occurrence.” See Bomgardner v. 
State Farm Ins. Co., Civ. No. 10-1287, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96379, at *11-12 (E.D. 
Pa. Sept. 14, 2010) (stating Gambone stands for the proposition that “faulty 
workmanship, whether the fault of the insured or a subcontractor” does not constitute an 
occurrence). Nor does a foreseeable act like the subsequent water infiltration into the 
structure. See Specialty Surfaces Int’l, Inc. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 609 F.3d 223, 231 (3d Cir. 
2010) (“Faulty workmanship, even when cast as a negligence claim, does not constitute 
[an occurrence]; nor do natural and foreseeable events like rainfall.”); Nationwide Mut. 
Ins. Co., 562 F.3d at 596 (finding no insurance coverage because consequential damages 
were “too foreseeable to be considered an accident”). Monmouth‟s allegations do not 
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present the requisite fortuity to qualify as an “occurrence.”4 
III. 
 Because Pennsylvania law dictates the outcome here, we will affirm the judgment 
of the district court and deny Shoemaker‟s motion for certification to the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court. Insurance Companies are not required to defend or indemnify Shoemaker 
in the Underlying Action because the faulty workmanship on which Monmouth‟s claims 
are based does not constitute an “occurrence”  triggering the protections of the policies 
between Insurance Companies and Shoemaker.  
                                                 
4
 A more difficult question may be presented when a plaintiff sues a defendant for faulty 
workmanship without an underlying contract between the parties (such as when the 
plaintiff sues a subcontractor directly). See, e.g., Wausau Underwriters Ins. Co. v. State 
Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 557 F. Supp. 2d 502, 515 (D.N.J. 2008) (finding the existence of a 
contract crucial to the question of whether there has been an “occurrence,” since where 
there is a contract, “it can hardly be said that the insured‟s failure to perform up to its 
own bargained-for, self-imposed standards was fortuitous from the insured‟s point-of-
view”); Schuylkill Stone Corp. v. State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 735 F. Supp. 2d 150, 158 
(D.N.J. 2010) (finding there is an occurrence where there is no contract between the 
parties and the plaintiff in the underlying action alleges the defendant negligently 
manufactured products in violation of industry standards). But this is not such a case. 
Monmouth‟s claims in the Underlying Action are entirely based on Shoemaker‟s 
allegedly faulty workmanship in the execution of the construction contract. Since this 
case requires a straightforward application of Kvaerner and Gambone, we needn‟t reach 
the issue of whether faulty workmanship constitutes an “occurrence” in the absence of a 
contract between the relevant parties. 
